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1. Introduction
Beginning this special issue of the Utrecht Law Review, Sabine Gless and John Vervaele define transnational 
crimes as offences that affect multiple jurisdictions but are not core crimes in public international law; 
transnational criminal law (TCL) is ‘the sum of existing laws applying to transnational crime’.1 Arguing 
that the right to a fair trial is indeed one of TCL’s general principles, Gless then asks whether the use 
of foreign evidence –  and the supranational coordination of evidence gathering – could undermine 
the individual’s right to a defence under Article 6(3) of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR).2 As she points out, the risks to and requirements of Article 6 ECHR could vary depending on 
the transnational dimensions of the criminal proceedings. In other words, the ways in which national, 
supranational or international authorities share the tasks of investigating, prosecuting and sanctioning 
transnational offences could determine the ways in which the right to a fair trial may be infringed. I 
continue her inquiry by considering the relevance of the ECHR’s fair trial rights in another type of 
transnational (criminal) proceedings, namely, cooperative efforts to ‘recover’ assets that are associated 
with acts of grand corruption. Precisely, I ask how the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is 
likely to deal with the argument that State Parties to the ECHR and its protocols have violated the right 
to a fair trial by directly enforcing confiscation orders issued abroad with respect to assets that are or that 
substitute for the proceeds, objects or instrumentalities of high-value, high-level political corruption 
offences3 (‘illicit wealth’). In so doing, I build on my previous and forthcoming studies of the interactions 
between corruption, asset recovery and human rights in public international law.4
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1	 S.	Gless	&	J.	Vervaele,	‘Law	Should	Govern:	Aspiring	General	Principles	for	Transnational	Criminal	Justice’,	2013	utrecht law review 9, 
no.	4,	pp.	1-10.	See	also,	N.	Boister,	‘“Transnational	Criminal	Law”?’	2003	European Journal of International law 14,	no.	5,	p.	955;	Ninth	
United	Nations	Congress	 on	 the	Prevention	of	 Crime	and	 Treatment	 of	Offenders,	 Interim	Report	 by	 the	 Secretariat:	 Results	 of	 the	
supplement	to	the	Fourth	United	Nations	Survey	of	Crime	Trends	and	Operations	of	Criminal	Justice	Systems,	on	Transnational	Crime, 
Cairo,	29	April–8	May	1995,	UN	Doc.	A/CONF.169/15/Add.1	(4	April	1995),	Para.	9.	
2	 S.	Gless,	 ‘Transnational	Cooperation	 in	Criminal	Matters	and	 the	Guarantee	of	 a	 Fair	 Trial:	Approaches	 to	a	General	Principle’,	 2013	
utrecht law review 9, no. 4, pp. 90-108.
3	 For	similar	definitions	of	‘grand	corruption’,	see	N.	Lash,	‘Corruption	and	Economic	Development’,	2004	Journal of Economic Asymmetries, 
no.	1,	p.	3;	G.	Moody-Stuart,	‘The	Costs	of	Grand	Corruption’,	1996	Economic reform Today,	no.	4,	p.	19;	C.	Nicholls	et	al.,	Corruption and 
the Misuse of Public Office,	2011,	Para.	1.07.
4	 See,	 in	 particular,	 R.	 Ivory,	Corruption, Asset recovery, and the Human right to Property in Public International law,	 2012,	 Baseler	
Dissertation,	Blue	Series,	 forthcoming	as	Corruption, Asset recovery, and the Protection of Property in Public International law: The 
Human rights of bad Guys,	2014.
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This article has four substantive parts. Section 2 illustrates how understandings of corruption as 
transnational crimes have contributed to broad requirements for cooperative confiscation in international 
anti-corruption treaties and related instruments. Such ‘asset recovery’ measures are increasingly 
portrayed as supportive of some (economic, social and cultural) human rights, though the potential 
for tension between asset recovery measures and other (civil and political) entitlements have also been 
noted. Section 3 then considers the approach of the ECtHR to regulating the adverse consequences of 
international cooperation in criminal matters, in particular for the right to a fair trial. Analysing the 
ECtHR jurisprudence on the enforcement of foreign confiscation orders in matters of money laundering, 
it argues that the ‘flagrant denial of justice’ is the relevant standard for cooperative confiscation cases 
that aim at asset recovery. Section 4 explores how the ‘flagrant denial’ standard would be applied in asset 
recovery cases, analysing such matters as the scope of the ECHR, the features and evidence of ‘flagrant’ 
denials, and the standard of diligence expected of requested ECHR State Parties. The paper ends in 
Section 5 with a summary of the arguments and reflections on the ways in which the Court’s ‘flagrant 
denial’ case law could contribute to the formulation of a general principle on the right to a fair trial in 
TCL.
2. International efforts against corruption and for asset recovery – and human rights
My inquiry starts with the multilateral treaties and supranational legislative instruments that states 
concluded on the ‘phenomenon’ or ‘problem’ of corruption during the 1990s and the first decade of 
this century.5 Mirroring earlier suppression conventions and overlapping with treaties and instruments 
on extradition and mutual legal assistance (MLA, MLATs),6 what I call the ‘anti-corruption treaties’ 
contribute substantively and procedurally to TCL insofar as they treat corruption as a crime or a type 
of criminal behaviour(s).7 They depart from the assumption that corruption affects the interests of 
multiple states by distorting competition, facilitating organised crime and terrorism and endangering 
democracy and development, amongst other things.8 They do not generally define corruption in the 
abstract, but encourage or require their State Parties to criminalise various misuses of power or trust for 
reward, along with related behaviours that enable the enjoyment of the benefits of crime and/or inhibit 
5	 See,	esp.,	 the	Convention	drawn	up	on	the	basis	of	Article	K.3	of	 the	Treaty	on	European	Union,	on	the	protection	of	 the	European	
Communities’	financial	interests,	OJ	C	316,	27.11.1995,	p.	49	(EUCPFI)	and	its	first	and	second	protocols	(EUCPFI-P1	and	P2);	1996	Inter-
American	Convention	against	Corruption,	International legal Materials,	1996,	p.	724	(IACAC);	Council	Act	of	26	May	1997	drawing	up,	
on	the	basis	of	Article	K.3(2)(c)	of	the	Treaty	on	European	Union,	the	Convention	on	the	fight	against	corruption	involving	officials	of	the	
European	Communities	or	officials	of	Member	States	of	the	European	Union,	OJ	C	195,	25.6.1997,	p.	2	(EUOCC);	1997	Convention	on	
Combating	Bribery	of	Foreign	Public	Officials	in	International	Business	Transactions,	International legal Materials,	1998,	p.	1	(OECD-ABC);	
1999	 Criminal	 Law	 Convention	 on	 Corruption,	 2216	united nations Treaty Series,	 p.	 225;	 2000	 United	 Nations	 Convention	 against	
Transnational	Organized	Crime,	2225	united nations Treaty Series,	p.	209	(UNTOC);	2001	Protocol	Against	Corruption	to	the	Treaty	of	
the Southern African Development Community, <http://www.sadc.int/documents-publications/show/795>	(last	visited	13	September	
2013)	(SADC-PAC);	2003	African	Union	Convention	on	Preventing	and	Combating	Corruption,	International legal Materials,	2004,	p.	1	
(AUCPCC);	2003	United	Nations	Convention	against	Corruption,	2349	united nations Treaty Series,	p.	41	(UNCAC).
6	 See,	esp.,	1990	Convention	on	Money	Laundering,	the	Confiscation,	Search	and	Seizure	of	the	Proceeds	of	Crime,	1862	united nations 
Treaty Series,	p.	69;	1992	Inter-American	Convention	on	Mutual	Assistance	in	Criminal	Matters,	Organization of American States Treaty 
Service,	 no.	 75	 (IACMACM);	 Council	 Framework	 Decision	 2002/584/JHA	 of	 13	 June	 2002	 on	 the	 European	 arrest	 warrant	 and	 the	
surrender	procedures	between	Member	States,	OJ	L	190,	18.7.2002,	p.	1;	2002	Protocol	on	Mutual	Legal	Assistance	in	Criminal	Matters	
to	the	Treaty	of	the	Southern	African	Development	Community,	available	at	<http://www.sadc.int/documents-publications/show/807> 
(last	 visited	13	September	2013)	 (SADC-MLAP);	Council	 Framework	Decision	2006/783/JHA	of	6	October	2006	on	 the	application	of	
the	principle	of	mutual	recognition	to	confiscation	orders,	OJ	L	328,	25.11.2006,	p.	59	(EU	Dec.	2006/783/JHA);	2005	Council	of	Europe	
Convention	on	Laundering,	Search,	Seizure	and	Confiscation	of	the	Proceeds	from	Crime	and	on	the	Financing	of	Terrorism,	European 
Treaty Series,	no.	198.	See	also	Proposal	for	a	Directive	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	on	the	freezing	and	confiscation	of	
proceeds	of	crime	in	the	European	Union	of	12	March	2012,	COM(2012)	85	final,	2012/0036	(COD).
7	 Ivory,	supra	note	4,	Ch.	2,	3.	This	definition	excludes	the	1999	Civil	Law	Convention	on	Corruption,	2246	united nations Treaty Series,	p.	3,	
which	is	concerned	with	the	civil	law	responses	to	corruption,	and	the	2001	Protocol	on	the	Fight	Against	Corruption	to	the	Treaty	on	the	
Economic	Community	of	West	African	States,	reprinted	UNODC,	Compendium	of	International	Legal	Instruments	on	Corruption,	2005,	
<http://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/corruption-compendium-en.pdf>	(last	visited	22	December	2012),	p.	211,	which	has	not	
yet entered into force. See also J. Bacio Terracino, The International legal Framework against Corruption: States’ Obligations to Prevent 
and repress Corruption,	2012,	p.	3.	
8	 Ivory,	supra	note	4,	Ch.	2;	G.	Stessens,	‘The	International	Fight	against	Corruption’,	2001	International review of Penal law	72,	pp.	894-895.
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law enforcement.9 As is particularly important for this special issue, they also require State Parties to 
cooperate with each other in detecting, investigating, prosecuting and punishing Convention offences.10
Read with the related MLATs, the anti-corruption treaties generally oblige their Parties to cooperate 
for the purposes of confiscating illicit wealth and so, in the language of the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption (UNCAC), to contribute to ‘asset recovery’.11 I have argued elsewhere that ‘asset 
recovery’ is an ambiguous term in public international law.12 It can be broadly defined as a goal with two 
parts: (1) that ‘politically exposed persons’ (PEPs) and their close family members and associates should 
be significantly less able to move corruption-related wealth through financial institutions; and (2) that 
states with jurisdiction over corruption offences should be better able to obtain or regain ownership of 
those assets or substitute items. However, in another narrower sense, asset recovery is a catch-all phrase 
for the legal processes by which State Parties use each other’s coercive powers to achieve the return of 
illicit wealth. Of these processes, I will be most concerned with what I call ‘cooperative confiscations’, i.e., 
the compulsory assumption of ownership of illicit wealth by a state with enforcement jurisdiction over 
those things (the ‘haven state’) at the behest of a state with legislative and judicial competence over the 
alleged offence (the ‘victim state’).13
Though clearly foreseen as a means to prevent, deter and remediate corruption and associated 
money laundering, cooperative confiscations only rarely succeed in achieving the goal of asset recovery in 
practice. Frequently, those seeking the ‘return of wealth’ falter at one or more ‘barriers to recovery’: weak 
political support from other government decision-makers; non-compliance with the legal requirements 
for confiscation or cooperation in the victim or haven state; the inability of the parties to locate the 
assets or to restrain them before they are transformed or transferred to another jurisdiction – the list 
goes on.14 In response, states have employed alternative strategies for securing the return of illicit wealth 
to victim countries. These include civil and criminal proceedings in haven jurisdictions; settlements 
between prosecutors and those close to former regimes; and financial sanctions with respect to current 
or serving leaders.15 In addition, through the anti-corruption and related MLA treaties and instruments, 
states have recommended or required the adoption of measures that relax the requirements of proof of 
the predicate offence or the connection between the thing and the offence.16 The UNCAC, most notably, 
foresees that State Parties may require offenders to demonstrate the lawful origins of ‘property liable to 
confiscation (…)’.17 It recommends that they criminalise illicit enrichment.18 And, in ‘appropriate cases’, 
it requires them to ‘[c]onsider taking such measures as may be necessary to allow confiscation of such 
property [of foreign origin] without a criminal conviction (…)’.19 
International efforts to combat corruption are increasingly perceived as supportive of human 
rights.20 A study issued under the auspices of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in 2011 
calls for a ‘human rights-based approach’ to asset recovery in which victim and haven states (or, better 
9	 On	the	concept	of	‘corruption’	in	the	anti-corruption	treaties,	see	further	Ivory,	supra	note	4,	Ch.	2	and	Ch.	3.	Cf.	J. Bacio Terracino, The 
International legal Framework against Corruption: States’ Obligations to Prevent and repress Corruption,	2012,	pp.	18-21.
10	 Ivory,	supra	note	4,	Ch.	2;	C.	Nicholls	et	al.,	Corruption and the Misuse of Public Office,	2006,	Para.	9.04;	C.	Nicholls	et	al.,	Corruption and 
the Misuse of Public Office,	2011,	Pt.	VI.
11	 UNCAC,	Preamble,	Art.	1(b),	Ch.	V.	See	also	UNCAC,	Arts.	37(1),	46(3)(k).	See	further	Ivory,	supra	note	4,	Ch.	4.	
12	 Ivory,	supra	note	4,	Ch.	2.
13 Surveyed in Ivory, supra note 4, Ch. 4.
14	 See	generally	K.	Stephenson	et	al.,	barriers to Asset recovery: An Analysis of the Key barriers and recommendations for Action,	2011.
15	 For	a	survey	of	key	asset	recovery	cases	 involving	Switzerland,	see	 Ivory,	supra	note	4,	Ch.	2,	as	well	as	 the	diverse	contributions	to	
M.	Pieth	(ed.),	recovering Stolen Assets,	2008.
16	 See,	 in	 particular,	 COECrimCC,	 Art.	 19(3)	 read	 with	 its	 Explanatory	 Report,	 Paras.	 93-94;	 COEMLC	 1990,	 Art.	 13	 read	 with	 its	
Explanatory	Report,	Para.	43;	COEMLC	2005,	Art.	23(5)	read	with	Explanatory	Report,	Paras.	164-165;	COM(2012)	85	final,	Arts.	4(1),	5;	 
EU	Dec.	2005/121/JHA,	Art.	3(2);	UNCAC,	Arts.	31(8),	54(1)(c).	See	further,	Ivory,	supra	note	4,	Ch.	4.
17	 UNCAC,	Art.	31(8).
18	 UNCAC,	Art.	20	(‘when	committed	intentionally,	(…)	a	significant	increase	in	the	assets	of	a	public	official	that	he	or	she	cannot	reasonably	
explain	 in	 relation	 to	 his	 or	 her	 lawful	 income’).	 There	 is	 no	 requirement	 that	 the	 state	 prove	 that	 an	 official	 obtained	 the	 assets	
through	an	offence	involving	the	abuse	of	public	power	or	trust:	see	further	UNODC	Division	for	Treaty	Affairs,	Legislative	Guide	for	the	
Implementation	of	the	United	Nations	Convention	against	Corruption,	2006,	<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/legislative-
guide.html>	(last	visited	11	January	2013),	Para.	296;	D.	Wilsher,	‘Inexplicable	Wealth	and	Illicit	Enrichment	of	Public	Officials:	A	Model	
Draft	that	Respects	Human	Rights	in	Corruption	Cases’,	2006	Crime, law & Social Change	45,	p.	28.
19	 UNCAC,	Art.	54(1)(c).
20	 International	 Council	 on	Human	 Rights	 Policy	 (ICHRP)	 and	 TI, Integrating Human rights in the Anti-Corruption Agenda: Challenges, 
Possibilities and Opportunities,	2010,	<http://www.ichrp.org/en/projects/131>	(last	visited	12	January	2013),	p.	63.
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put, their representatives) perceive their parallel duties to ‘seek repatriation (…) [and] to assist and 
facilitate repatriation (…)’.21 These arise, it finds, from the ‘duty to ensure the application of the maximum 
available resources to the full realization of economic, social, and cultural rights’ and the ‘obligation 
of international cooperation and assistance (…)’.22 According to the study, measures to enhance the 
prospects of asset recovery do not necessarily compromise due process. Citing the ECtHR, it argues 
that non-conviction-based (NCB) confiscation regimes and presumptions of illicit acquisition may be 
remedial and proportionate restrictions of the presumption of innocence.23 Thus, it recommends that, 
‘When appropriate, recipient countries of funds of illicit origin should de-link confiscation measures 
from a requirement of conviction in the country of origin; (…).24 These recommendations are in keeping 
with the observation made by others elsewhere that corrupt officials are well placed to use national 
jurisdictional boundaries and legal rights to defeat law enforcement efforts.25 
At the same time, it would seem antithetical to the concept of universal and inalienable human rights 
to allow limitations to entitlements just because of an individual’s location vis-à-vis a cooperating state 
and/or alleged crime (or an association with a sort of alleged criminal).26 Hence, the Office of the High 
Commissioner has cautioned states against ignoring the human rights implications of anti-corruption 
policies and ‘techniques’,27 as have human rights and anti-corruption NGOs in exploring the connection 
between their areas of expertise.28 Meanwhile, legal academics have warned of new risks to individual 
rights through international cooperation and asset-related measures.29 The circumstances in which states 
are most likely to seek asset recovery – during or immediately after a ‘radical political transformation’30 – 
may also be the source of concerns about the reasons for cooperation and the fairness of the proceedings, 
as I have discussed elsewhere.31 In this contribution, I consider the underlying issue, namely, the potential 
or perceived tension between human rights and anti-corruption policies. I do so through the lens of 
Article 6 ECHR and from the perspective of the haven state in cooperative confiscation proceedings that 
aim at asset recovery, in particular with non-contracting (‘third’) states.32 My focus is on the UNCAC, 
21	 UN	High	Commissioner	for	Human	Rights	(HRC),	Comprehensive	study	on	the	negative	impact	of	the	non-repatriation	of	funds	of	illicit	
origin	to	the	countries	of	origin	on	the	enjoyment	of	human	rights,	in	particular	economic,	social	and	cultural	rights,	UN	Doc.	A/HRC/19/42	
(14	December	2011),	Para.	25,	as	well	as	Para.	38.	See	also	Human	Rights	Council,	The	negative	impact	of	the	non-repatriation	of	funds	
of	illicit	origin	to	the	countries	of	origin	on	the	enjoyment	of	human	rights,	and	the	importance	of	improving	international	cooperation,	
UN	Doc.	A/HRC/RES/22/12	(10	April	2013).
22	 HRC,	Comprehensive	 study	on	 the	negative	 impact	of	 the	non-repatriation	of	 funds	of	 illicit	origin	 to	 the	countries	of	origin	on	 the	
enjoyment	of	human	rights,	in	particular	economic,	social	and	cultural	rights,	UN	Doc.	A/HRC/19/24	(14	December	2011),	Para.	25.	
23	 HRC,	Comprehensive	 study	on	 the	negative	 impact	of	 the	non-repatriation	of	 funds	of	 illicit	origin	 to	 the	countries	of	origin	on	 the	
enjoyment	of	human	rights,	in	particular	economic,	social	and	cultural	rights,	UN	Doc.	A/HRC/19/24	(14	December	2011),	Para.	46.
24	 HRC,	Comprehensive	 study	on	 the	negative	 impact	of	 the	non-repatriation	of	 funds	of	 illicit	origin	 to	 the	countries	of	origin	on	 the	
enjoyment	of	human	 rights,	 in	particular	economic,	 social	and	cultural	 rights,	UN	Doc.	A/HRC/19/24	 (14	December	2011),	Para.	63,	
Recommendation	(a)(iv).	See	also	UN	Doc.	A/HRC/19/24,	Para.	46.	HRC	Res.	17/23:	The	negative	impact	of	non-repatriation	of	funds	of	
illicit	origin	to	the	countries	of	origin	on	the	enjoyment	of	human	rights,	UN	Doc.	A/HRC/17/23	(19	July	2011).
25	 K.	Stephenson	et	al.,	barriers to Asset recovery: An Analysis of the Key barriers and recommendations for Action,	2011,	p.	12;	J.	Thuo	
Gathii,	 ‘Defining	 the	 Relationship	 between	 Human	 Rights	 and	 Corruption’,	 2009	university of Pennsylvania Journal of International 
law	31,	pp.	161-171.
26	 See	W.	 Kälin	 &	 J.	 Künzli,	 The law of International Human rights Protection,	 2010,	 p.	 32	 (defining	 human	 rights	 as	 ‘internationally	
guaranteed	legal	entitlements	of	individuals	vis-à-vis	the	state,	which	serve	to	protect	fundamental	characteristics	of	the	human	person	
and	his	or	her	dignity	(…)’.).
27	 UN	High	Commissioner	 for	Human	Rights	 in	 cooperation	with	 the	Government	of	 the	Republic	of	Poland,	Background	Note:	United	
Nations	Conference	on	Anti-Corruption	Measures,	Good	Governance	and	Human	Rights,	Warsaw,	8–9	November	2006,	HR/POL/GG/
SEM/2006/2,	Para.	14.
28	 International	 Council	 on	Human	 Rights	 Policy	 (ICHRP)	 and	 TI, Integrating Human rights in the Anti-Corruption Agenda: Challenges, 
Possibilities and Opportunities,	2010,	<http://www.ichrp.org/en/projects/131>	(last	visited	12	January	2013),	pp.	63-69.
29	 On	 cooperation,	 see	Gless,	 supra	 note	 2. On	 confiscation	 and	 related	measures,	 see	 generally	 P.	 Alldridge,	Money laundering law: 
Forfeiture, Confiscation, Civil recovery, Criminal laundering and Taxation of the Proceeds of Crime,	2003;	M.	Gallant,	Money laundering 
and the Proceeds of Crime: Economic Crime and Civil remedies,	2005;	M.	Pieth,	‘Article	3(3).	Seizure	and	Confiscation’,	in	M.	Pieth	et	al.	
(eds.), The OECD Convention on bribery: A Commentary,	2007,	pp.	259-260;	G.	Stessens,	Money laundering: A new International law 
Enforcement Model,	2000,	pp.	68-76.	On	counter-terrorist	asset	 freezes,	see,	e.g.,	 I.	Cameron,	 ‘The	European	Convention	on	Human	
Rights,	 Due	 Process	 and	 United	 Nations	 Security	 Council	 Counter-Terrorism	 Sanctions,	 2006’,	 <http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/cahdi/
Texts_&_Documents/Docs%202006/I.%20Cameron%20Report%2006.pdf>	(last	visited	12	January	2013);	C.	Eckes,	Eu Counter-Terrorist 
Policies and Fundamental rights,	2009.	
30	 See	generally,	R.	Teitel,	Transitional Justice,	 2000,	p.	4.	 See	also	F.	Ni	Aolain	&	C.	Campbell,	 ‘The	Paradox	of	Transition	 in	Conflicted	
Democracies’,	2005	Human rights Quarterly	27,	no.	1,	pp.	172-213.	
31	 Ivory,	supra	note	4,	Ch.	5.	See	also	TI-UK,	‘Combating	Money	Laundering	and	Recovering	Looted	Gains:	Raising	the	UK’s	Game’,	2009,	
<http://www.transparency.org.uk/publications>	(last	visited	10	March	2011),	Para.	177.
32 See also Ivory, supra note 4, Ch. 5.
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which is the most recent and extensive anti-corruption treaty and which links (developed) states in 
Europe with (developing) states in other regions in commitments against corruption.
3. The adverse consequences of cooperation and the (flagrant) denial of Article 6 ECHR
As Sabine Gless explains, State Parties to the ECHR may violate that Convention and its protocols by 
cooperating with other states in criminal matters even though the ‘adverse consequences’ of assistance 
have occurred or may occur abroad.33 The leading case is Soering v UK,34 where the ECtHR established 
that a requested State Party incurs liability under Article 3 ECHR if it orders the extradition of an 
individual to a state in which there are ‘substantial grounds (...) for believing that [he/she] (...) faces a real 
risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (...)’.35 If there 
is such a risk, Article 3 ECHR implicitly prohibits extradition, ‘however heinous the crime allegedly 
committed’.36 Any other conclusion, Soering says, would be incompatible with ‘the underlying values of 
the Convention, that “common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law” to 
which the Preamble refers (…)’.37
In obiter, the Court in Soering also held that requested states might exceptionally violate 
Article  6  ECHR if ‘the fugitive has suffered or risks suffering a flagrant denial of a fair trial in the 
requesting country’.38 Subsequently, in Drozd and Janousek v France and Spain, the ECtHR applied this 
principle to the enforcement of a foreign criminal sentence under Article 5 ECHR.39 The majority found 
that France would have been obliged to refuse to execute the Andorran prison sentences had it emerged 
that the Andorran convictions were ‘the result of a flagrant denial of justice (…)’, though this ‘[was 
not] shown (…) in the circumstances of the case (…)’.40 Furthermore, as France was not required to 
‘impose [the Convention’s] standards’ on the (then) non-party, Andorra, it was under no duty to ‘verify 
whether proceedings which resulted in the conviction were compatible with all the requirements of 
[Article 6 ECHR].’41 To hold otherwise would have ‘thwart[ed] the current trend towards strengthening 
international co-operation in the administration of justice, (…)’.42
The ECtHR appeared to apply a stricter ‘yardstick’ for assessing the compatibility of foreign 
proceedings with Article 6 ECHR in Pellegrini v Italy.43 In that case, Italian judges had confirmed and 
enforced a Vatican order that annulled the applicant’s marriage and defeated her claim to maintenance.44 
The applicant had not had access to the file before the Vatican courts and had not been informed of her 
right to counsel.45 Strasbourg noted that the Vatican was not a party to the Convention. With regard to 
Italy’s responsibility, it described its task as being
‘to enquire not into whether the proceedings before the ecclesiastical courts complied with 
Article 6 of the Convention, but into whether the Italian courts, before granting confirmation 
and execution of the said annulment, duly checked that the proceedings relating thereto satisfied 
the guarantees contained in Article 6. (…)’46
33	 Gless,	supra	note	2.	See	also	A.	van	Hoek	&	M.	Luchtman,	‘Transnational	Cooperation	in	Criminal	Matters	and	the	Safeguarding	of	Human	
Rights’,	2005	utrecht law review	1,	no.	2,	pp.	5-6.	See,	e.g.,	Al-Skeini and Others v uK	[GC],	appl.	no.	55721/07,	[2011]	ECHR,	Para.	133.
34 Soering v uK,	[1989]	ECHR	(Ser.	A).
35 Soering v uK,	[1989]	ECHR	(Ser.	A),	Para.	91.
36 Soering v uK,	[1989]	ECHR	(Ser.	A),	Para.	89.
37 Soering v uK,	[1989]	ECHR	(Ser.	A),	Para.	89.	
38 Soering v uK,	[1989]	ECHR	(Ser.	A),	Para.	113.
39 Drozd and Janousek v France and Spain,	 [1992]	ECHR	(Ser.	A).	See	further	J.	Dugard	&	C.	van	den	Wyngaert,	 ‘Reconciling	Extradition	
with	Human	Rights’,	1998	American Journal of International law	92,	pp.	203-204.	See	also	Iribarne Pérez v France,	[1995]	ECHR	(Ser.	A),	
Para.	29;	Ivory,	supra	note	4,	Ch.	5	(with	further	references).
40 Drozd and Janousek v France and Spain,	[1992]	ECHR	(Ser.	A),	Para.	110.
41 Drozd and Janousek v France and Spain,	[1992]	ECHR	(Ser.	A),	Para.	110.
42 Drozd and Janousek v France and Spain,	[1992]	ECHR	(Ser.	A),	Para.	110.
43 Pellegrini v Italy,	appl.	no.	30882/96,	[2001-VIII]	ECHR,	Para.	40.
44 Pellegrini v Italy,	appl.	no.	30882/96,	[2001-VIII]	ECHR,	Paras.	26-30.
45 Pellegrini v Italy,	appl.	no.	30882/96,	[2001-VIII]	ECHR,	Paras.	44-46.
46 Pellegrini v Italy,	appl.	no.	30882/96,	[2001-VIII]	ECHR,	Para.	40.
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Unconvinced of Italy’s reasons for dismissing the applicant’s complaints in the enforcement proceedings, 
the ECtHR found a violation of the right to an equal hearing under Article 6(1) ECHR. 
The early case law thus raises the question of whether the ECtHR in fact uses two standards to 
determine when ECHR State Parties are responsible for foreign procedural flaws under Article 6; if 
there are two standards, the further issue for this article is which standard would apply to cooperative 
confiscations that aim at asset recovery.47 The closest and most informative case to date is Saccoccia 
v Austria in which the applicant US citizen had been convicted of ‘large-scale money laundering’.48 
The US District Court had ordered the forfeiture of some USD 136 million in proceeds and substitute 
assets, including cash, bonds and other financial instruments found in an Austrian apartment that had 
been leased in the applicant’s name.49 The Austrian Ministry of Justice had admitted the US request for 
enforcement of the final forfeiture order; the Vienna Regional Criminal Court had approved the order’s 
execution;50 and the Vienna Court of Appeal had rejected the applicant’s challenges to the orders under 
Articles 6 and 7 ECHR and Article 1 of the Protocol to the ECHR (ECHR-P1). Before the ECtHR, the 
applicant sought to show, under Article 6, that the Austrian courts had failed to sufficiently consider 
deficiencies in the US criminal and confiscation proceedings.51 Adapting the language of Pellegrini to 
express the test in Soering and Drozd and Janousek:
‘The Court observe[d] at the outset that its task [did] not consist in examining whether the 
proceedings before the United States courts complied with Article 6 of the Convention, but 
whether the Austrian courts, before authorising the enforcement of the forfeiture order, duly 
satisfied themselves that the decision at issue was not the result of a flagrant denial of justice.’52 
The First Section acknowledged the potentially competing standard in Pellegrini but found that it ‘was 
not called upon to decide in the abstract which level of review was required from a Convention point of 
view’: compliance with the principles of Article 6 ECHR had been a condition for enforcing the US order 
under the Austrian MLA law.53 Although the Austrian courts had ‘followed in essence the reasons given 
by the United States Court of Appeals, (...)’ the ECtHR found that ‘[they had] duly satisf[ied] themselves, 
before authorising the enforcement of the forfeiture order, that the applicant had had a fair trial under 
United States law’.54 The ECtHR cited Saccoccia to dismiss a second US drug-money launderer’s complaint 
in Duboc v Austria.55 Perhaps in view of Saccoccia, Mr Duboc only complained about the fairness of the 
Austrian exequatur proceedings under Article 6 ECHR.56
In Saccoccia, the ECtHR had also rejected the applicant’s submission that the enforcement 
proceedings themselves involved the determination of a ‘criminal charge’ under Article 6 ECHR and the 
imposition of a retrospective penalty under Article 7 ECHR.57 In its view, Austria had only determined 
the applicant’s guilt in the abstract when it ascertained that the dual criminality requirement was fulfilled 
and that it could execute the US penalty.58 The exequatur order was, moreover, a measure to enforce 
the US penalty rather than a penalty in its own right.59 The exequatur proceedings were nevertheless 
within the scope of the civil limb of Article 6(1) ECHR as they effectuated a decision that determined 
47	 T.	Schilling,	‘The	Enforcement	of	Foreign	Judgments	in	the	Jurisprudence	of	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights’,	2012	rivista di diritto 
internazionale privato e processuale,	 available	 at	 <http://works.bepress.com/theodor_schilling/9>	 (last	 visited	 12	 October	 2012),	
p.	28.	See	also	J.	Fawcett,	‘The	Impact	of	Article	6(1)	of	the	ECHR	on	Private	International	Law’,	2012	International & Comparative law 
Quarterly 56,	no.	1,	pp.	5,	35,	43;	A.	van	Hoek	&	M.	Luchtman,	‘Transnational	Cooperation	in	Criminal	Matters	and	the	Safeguarding	of	
Human	Rights’,	2005	utrecht law review	1,	no.	2	pp.	8-9.
48 Saccoccia v Austria (dec.),	 appl.	 no.	 69917/01,	5	 July	2007,	 ‘The	Facts’,	 Para.	A(1);	Saccoccia v Austria	 (merits),	 appl.	 no.	 69917/01,	
18	December	2008.
49 Saccoccia v Austria	(dec.),	appl.	no.	69917/01,	5	July	2007,	‘The	Facts’,	Para.	A(1).
50 Saccoccia v Austria	(dec.),	appl.	no.	69917/01,	5	July	2007,	‘The	Facts’,	Para.	A(2).
51 Saccoccia v Austria	(dec.),	appl.	no.	69917/01,	5	July	2007,	‘The	Facts’,	Paras.	A(2),	1-4.
52 Saccoccia v Austria	(dec.),	appl.	no.	69917/01,	5	July	2007,	‘The	Law’,	Para.	2.
53 Saccoccia v Austria	(dec.),	appl.	no.	69917/01,	5	July	2007,	‘The	Facts’,	Paras.	B(1),	2.
54 Saccoccia v Austria	(dec.),	appl.	no.	69917/01,	5	July	2007,	‘The	Law’,	Para.	2.
55 Duboc v Austria	(dec.),	appl.	no.	8154/04,	5	June	2012.
56 Duboc v Austria	(dec.),	appl.	no.	8154/04,	5	June	2012,	Para.	30.
57 Saccoccia v Austria	(dec.),	appl.	no.	69917/01,	5	July	2007,	‘Complaints’.
58 Saccoccia v Austria	(dec.),	appl.	no.	69917/01,	5	July	2007,	‘The	Law’,	Para.	1(1)(1)(a).
59 Saccoccia v Austria	(dec.),	appl.	no.	69917/01,	5	July	2007,	‘The	Law’,	Para.	1(3).
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the applicant’s ‘civil rights and obligations’.60 On the facts of Saccoccia (and Duboc), Austria had complied 
with the ‘public oral hearing’ requirement of Article 6(1) ECHR.61 The decisions, which ‘concerned rather 
technical issues of inter-State cooperation in combating money-laundering through the enforcement of a 
foreign forfeiture order’, could be determined without a public hearing and without taking the applicants’ 
submissions in person.62 Later in the Saccoccia judgment, the Court found that the applicant had been 
allowed to participate, through his legal representatives, in the judicial proceedings and had made ‘ample’ 
submissions, which the Viennese courts had considered in detailed written decisions.63 As a result, Austria 
had violated neither Article 6(1) ECHR nor, for that matter, Article 1 ECHR-P1, the right to property.
Saccoccia and Duboc verify my assumption that persons affected by enforcement orders may allege 
deficiencies in the foreign criminal trial and/or confiscation proceeding, as well as deficiencies with 
the local exequatur proceeding in the requested ECHR State Party. They also confirm that the ECtHR 
is prepared to consider whether State Parties have exposed or may expose such individuals to unfair 
criminal or confiscation proceeding by executing foreign confiscation orders. The Court in Saccoccia 
appears to prevaricate about the standard to be used in making this assessment. Nonetheless, in my 
submission, it favours the view that requested State Parties would only incur Convention responsibility 
if they fail to consider whether the foreign order was ‘the result of a flagrant denial of justice’.64 Not 
only does the Court frame its task as such in Saccoccia but it does so by paraphrasing Pellegrini. Also, 
the ECtHR has since reinterpreted Pellegrini in line with Drozd and Janousek,65 and it has repeatedly 
applied the flagrant denial test in other cases on extradition and expulsion;66 the transfer of prisoners 
to international criminal tribunals;67 and the enforcement of foreign child custody orders.68 Finally, it 
would be inconsistent for the Court to apply Article 6 ECHR more strictly in cooperative confiscation 
cases than in cases on extraditions and prisoner transfers since the latter involve greater interference with 
personal autonomy.
4. The ‘flagrant denial of justice’ standard applied
If I am correct, the ECtHR’s own role in cooperative confiscation cases would be limited to ascertaining 
whether the requested State Party had correctly applied the flagrant denial standard. The issue would thus 
become how the ECtHR applies the flagrant denial standard to cooperative confiscation proceedings that 
aim at asset recovery.
4.1. The scope of the ECHR 
A preliminary issue is whether such cooperative confiscations would be within the scope of the ECHR 
having regard to the location of the alleged victim and the parallel, treaty-based obligation to cooperate in 
criminal matters. On the one hand, Mr Saccoccia was imprisoned in the US at the time of the execution 
of the request and so was neither in Austria’s national territory nor in a territory under its effective 
control. If the location of the accused determines the application of the Convention and its protocols, as 
commentary on Soering and Drozd and Janousek suggests,69 I would ask whether the Court applied the 
60 Saccoccia v Austria	(dec.),	appl.	no.	69917/01,	5	July	2007,	‘The	Law’,	Para.	1(1)(1)(a).
61 Saccoccia v Austria	(merits),	appl.	no.	69917/01,	18	December	2008,	Paras.	70-80;	Duboc v Austria	(dec.),	appl.	no.	8154/04,	5	June	2012,	
Para.	38.
62 Saccoccia v Austria (merits),	 appl.	 no.	 69917/01,	 18	 December	 2008,	 Paras.	 78-79	 quoted	 and	 applied	 in	 Duboc v Austria (dec.), 
appl.	no.	8154/04,	5	June	2012,	Paras.	39-40.
63 Saccoccia v Austria	(merits),	appl.	no.	69917/01,	18	December	2008,	Paras.	87,	89-91.
64 See also Stapleton v Ireland,	(dec.),	appl.	no.	56588/07,	[2010]	ECHR,	Paras.	27-32.
65 lindberg v Sweden,	appl.	no.	48198/99,	15	January	2004,	‘The	Law’,	Para.	1.
66 See, e.g., Cruz Varas and Others v Sweden,	[1990]	ECHR	(Ser.	A),	Paras.	69-70,	82;	Vilvarajah and Others v uK,	[1992]	(Ser.	A),	Para.	103;	
Chahal v uK,	[1996-V]	ECHR,	Para.	80; Einhorn v France,	appl.	no.	71555/01,	[2001-XI]	ECHR,	Paras.	32-34;	Mamatkulov and Askarov v 
Turkey	[GC],	[2005-I]	ECHR,	Paras.	88-91.	
67 naletilić v Croatia	(dec.),	[2000-V]	ECHR.
68 Eskinazi and Chelouche v Turkey	 (dec.),	 [2005-XIII]	 ECHR,	 Para.	 C(2);	Maumousseau and Washington v France,	 appl.	 no.	 39388/05,	
6	December	2007,	Paras.	95-99.
69	 R.	 Lawson,	 ‘Life	After	bankovic:	On	 the	 Extraterritorial	 Application	of	 the	 European	Convention	on	Human	Rights’,	 in	 F.	 Coomans	&	
M.	Kamminga	(eds.),	Extraterritorial Application of Human rights Treaties,	2004,	p.	84;	M.	Milanovic,	The Extraterritorial Application of 
Human rights Treaties,	2011,	p.	9;	M.	O’Boyle,	‘The	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights	and	Extraterritorial	Jurisdiction:	A	Comment	
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correct set of principles in Saccoccia70 or whether it is generally correct to treat extraditions as territorial 
exercises of jurisdiction under Article 1 ECHR.71 On the other hand, I note that in neither Saccoccia nor 
Duboc did the Court consider whether Austria’s duty to enforce the confiscation order under its MLAT 
with the US was at odds with its duty to secure the applicants’ fundamental rights and freedoms under 
the ECHR and ECHR-P1. Marko Milanovic characterises Soering-style cases of international cooperation 
in criminal matters as raising unavoidable and irresolvable norm conflicts in public international law.72 
I share his view, though I think it unlikely that the Court would be willing to acknowledge the conflict 
as such.73 
4.2. The degree of injustice 
Presuming that cooperative confiscations are within the scope of the ECHR, what procedural flaws would 
render an ECHR haven state responsible for irregularities in a victim state’s asset recovery proceedings? 
The Court does not list criteria for distinguishing ‘flagrant’ from ‘ordinary’ denials of justice in Soering or 
Drozd and Janousek. However, in Ahorugeze v Sweden, it described a ‘flagrant denial’ as ‘go[ing] beyond 
mere irregularities or lack of safeguards in the trial procedures (...)’.74 It results in ‘a trial which is manifestly 
contrary to the provisions of Article 6 or the principles embodied therein’ and which ‘breach[es] (...) the 
principles of fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 (...) so fundamental[ly] as to amount to a nullification, or 
destruction of the very essence, of the right (...)’.75 
The ECtHR confirmed and applied these principles in Othman (Abu Qatada) v UK.76 There, the 
ECtHR found a breach of Article 6 ECHR due to a real risk of a retrial on the basis of ‘torture evidence’.77 
A Jordanian national, Mr Othman, was to be deported from the UK following his convictions in absentia 
in Jordan for participating in terrorist conspiracies.78 Mr Othman lost an initial challenge before the 
UK Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) and, after a victory before the Court of Appeal, 
failed again before the House of Lords.79 The SIAC had found ‘at least a very real risk’ that Jordanian 
intelligence officials had obtained the decisive witness statements through torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment.80 It also found it very probable that the Jordanian State Security Court would admit 
those statements in a retrial.81 Nonetheless, having regard to the safeguards in any such proceedings, the 
SIAC considered that the retrial as a whole would be fair.82 
For Strasbourg, by contrast, the admission of torture evidence at a foreign criminal trial would 
amount to a flagrant denial of justice;83 it was sufficient, moreover, for the applicant to show a ‘real risk’ 
that an institution like the Jordanian State Security Courts would admit such information. Citing UN 
and NGO reports, it found those courts could not be trusted to maintain their ‘independen[ce] of the 
executive’, to ‘prosecut[e] [cases] impartially’ and to ‘conscientiously investigat[e]’ allegations of torture;84 
their guarantees for the rights of the defence were of no ‘real practical value (...)’.85 They were, in short, 
on	“Life	after	bankovic”’,	in	F.	Coomans	&	M.	Kamminga	(eds.),	Extraterritorial Application of Human rights Treaties,	2004,	pp.	126-127.	
Cf.	G.	Gilbert,	responding to International Crime,	2006,	p.	141.
70	 See	also	M.	Milanovic,	The Extraterritorial Application of Human rights Treaties,	2011,	p.	126.
71 Ivory, supra note 4, Ch. 5. 
72	 M.	Milanovic,	The Extraterritorial Application of Human rights Treaties,	2011,	pp.	243-248.	Borrowing	from	Joost	Pauwelyn,	Milanovic	
defines	a	conflict	of	norms	as	a	situation	in	which	‘one	norm	constitutes,	has	led	to,	or	may	lead	to,	a	breach	of	the	other’:	Extraterritorial 
Application,	2011,	p.	236.	See	also	M.	Milanovic,	 ‘Norm	Conflict	 in	International	Law:	Whither	Human	Rights?’,	2009	Duke Journal of 
Comparative & International law	20,	p.	74.	
73 Ivory, supra note 4, Ch. 5. 
74 Ahorugeze v Sweden,	appl.	no.	37075/09,	27	October	2011,	Para.	115.	See	also	Othman (Abu Qatada) v uK,	appl.	no.	8139/09,	17	January	
2012,	Para.	260.
75 Ahorugeze v Sweden, appl. no.	37075/09,	27	October	2011,	Paras.	114-115.	
76 See also Othman (Abu Qatada) v uK,	appl.	no.	8139/09,	17	January	2012,	Paras.	259-260.
77 Othman (Abu Qatada) v uK,	appl.	no.	8139/09,	17	January	2012,	Para.	282.
78 Othman (Abu Qatada) v uK,	appl.	no.	8139/09,	17	January	2012,	Paras.	1,	25.
79 Othman (Abu Qatada) v uK,	appl.	no.	8139/09,	17	January	2012,	Paras.	26-66.
80 Othman (Abu Qatada) v uK,	appl.	no.	8139/09,	17	January	2012,	Paras.	45,	269.
81 Othman (Abu Qatada) v uK,	appl.	no.	8139/09,	17	January	2012,	Paras.	25,	45.
82 Othman (Abu Qatada) v uK,	appl.	no.	8139/09,	17	January	2012,	Para.	46.
83 Othman (Abu Qatada) v uK,	appl.	no.	8139/09,	17	January	2012,	Para.	267.
84 Othman (Abu Qatada) v uK,	appl.	no.	8139/09,	17	January	2012,	Para.	276.
85 Othman (Abu Qatada) v uK,	appl.	no.	8139/09,	17	January	2012,	Paras.	276-278.
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a ‘criminal justice system which is complicit in the very practices which it exists to prevent (...)’.86 As 
‘detailed, (...) clear and specific’ reports of torture by Mr Othman’s co-defendants were corroborated by 
general accounts of the use of torture and torture evidence in Jordan, there was at least a real risk that 
torture evidence would be admitted against the applicant in a retrial.87 
The ECtHR’s Second Section applied – and perhaps extended – Othman in El Haski v Belgium.88 
The applicant, a Moroccan national, had been convicted in Belgium of participating in a Moroccan 
terrorist organisation.89 His conviction was based, in part, on witness statements gathered in Morocco 
and transmitted to Belgium by Moroccan authorities.90 These statements, he alleged, had been obtained 
through conduct that was contrary to Article 3 ECHR; hence, he claimed, his Belgian criminal trial was 
unfair under Article 6 ECHR.91 The ECtHR agreed. Reports from NGOs and international organisations 
on the treatment of people like the witnesses indicated that there was a ‘real risk’ that those particular 
individuals had been tortured or exposed to inhuman or degrading treatment in custody.92 A ‘real risk’ 
was the appropriate standard when, ‘en tout cas, lorsque le système judiciaire de l’Etat tiers dont il est 
question n’offre pas de garanties réelles d’examen indépendant, impartial et sérieux des allégations de torture 
ou de traitements inhumains ou dégradants’.93 The Court also affirmed that the admission of evidence 
obtained through inhuman or degrading treatment could make a foreign criminal trial flagrantly unfair.94 
Whilst it is not impossible that foreign confiscation orders that aim at asset recovery would be tainted 
by torture evidence, it is more likely that they would involve less egregious allegations of unfairness: the 
use of evidentiary devices, such as presumptions of illicit acquisition, to prove the predicate offence 
or the connection between the thing and an offence; the hearing of proceedings by special tribunals; 
trials in absentia or the lack of a hearing for affected third parties; judicial dependence or bias; adverse 
media reporting or prejudicial comments by the executive; discrimination (or political motivation) in 
the decision to prosecute and/or seek confiscation; and so forth. The extradition and expulsion cases 
are also instructive here, however. In Othman, the Court admitted complaints that non-torture-related 
procedural flaws would together render the applicant’s Jordanian retrial flagrantly unfair. Amongst other 
things, Mr Othman had alleged that ‘a notorious civilian terrorist suspect’ such as himself could not 
expect to receive a fair trial before a ‘military court, aided by a military prosecutor’.95 The Fourth Section 
declined to examine these arguments on their merits96 but signalled, in obiter, that a flagrant denial of 
justice could arise due to:
‘–   conviction in absentia with no possibility subsequently to obtain a fresh determination of 
the merits of the charge (Einhorn, cited above, § 33; Sejdovic, cited above, § 84; Stoichkov, 
cited above, § 56);
–   a trial which is summary in nature and conducted with a total disregard for the rights of the 
defence (Bader and Kanbor, cited above, § 47);
–   detention without any access to an independent and impartial tribunal to have the legality 
the detention reviewed (Al-Moayad, cited above, § 101);
–  deliberate and systematic refusal of access to a lawyer, especially for an individual detained 
in a foreign country (ibid.).’97
86 Othman (Abu Qatada) v uK,	appl.	no.	8139/09,	17	January	2012,	Para.	267.
87 Othman (Abu Qatada) v uK,	appl.	no.	8139/09,	17	January	2012,	Paras.	269-271.
88 El Haski v belgium,	appl.	no.	649/08,	25	September	2012.	See	S.	Smet,	‘El Haski v belgium:	Continuing	Debate	on	the	(In)admissibility	of	
Evidence	Obtained	through	Ill-Treatment’,	<http://strasbourgobservers.com>	(last	visited	3	October	2012).
89 El Haski v belgium,	appl.	no.	649/08,	25	September	2012,	Paras.	1,	8,	25.
90 El Haski v belgium,	appl.	no.	649/08,	25	September	2012,	Paras.	24-25.
91 El Haski v belgium,	appl.	no.	649/08,	25	September	2012,	Para.	34.
92 El Haski v belgium,	appl.	no.	649/08,	25	September	2012,	Paras.	92-93.	See	further	S.	Smet,	‘El Haski v belgium:	Continuing	Debate	on	the	
(In)admissibility	of	Evidence	Obtained	through	Ill-Treatment’,	<http://strasbourgobservers.com>	(last	visited	3	October	2012).
93 El Haski v belgium,	appl.	no.	649/08,	25	September	2012,	Para.	88.
94 El Haski v belgium,	appl.	no.	649/08,	25	September	2012,	Para.	97;	S.	Smet,	‘El Haski v belgium:	Continuing	Debate	on	the	(In)admissibility	
of	Evidence	Obtained	through	Ill-Treatment’,	<http://strasbourgobservers.com>	(last	visited	3	October	2012). See also Othman (Abu Qatada) 
v uK,	appl.	no.	8139/09,	17	January	2012,	Para.	267.
95 Othman (Abu Qatada) v uK,	appl.	no.	8139/09,	17	January	2012,	Paras.	248,	268.
96 Othman (Abu Qatada) v uK,	appl.	no.	8139/09,	17	January	2012,	Paras.	268,	286.
97 Ahorugeze v Sweden, appl.	no.	37075/09,	27	October	2011,	Para.	115;	Othman (Abu Qatada) v uK,	appl.	no.	8139/09,	17	January	2012,	
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In Tsonyo Tsonev v Bulgaria (No. 3), the Court appeared to recognise a fifth, non-torture-related form 
of flagrant denial: ‘proceedings amounting to a mockery of basic fair trial principles’,98 as per Ilaşcu 
and Others v Moldova and Russia.99 Further, in El-Masri v ‘the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’, 
the Grand Chamber affirmed that ‘extraordinary rendition (…) which entails detention ...“outside the 
normal legal system” and which, “by its deliberate circumvention of due process, is anathema to the rule 
of law and the values protected by the Convention”’, flagrantly denies the rights in Article 5 ECHR.100
These cases both confirm that a range of serious procedural flaws could give rise to a flagrant denial 
of justice and make clear that the standard will be extremely difficult to satisfy under Article 6 ECHR 
in international cooperation matters. In the authorities just cited, the Court only found a violation of 
Article 6 ECHR in Stoichkov v Bulgaria where the respondent state had itself convicted the applicant in 
absentia.101 Of the cases involving an extradition or expulsion,102 the Court only found violations in Bader 
and Kanbor v Sweden where the applicants had already been convicted in absentia and sentenced to death 
in a third state (Syria) which had provided no assurance of a retrial, let alone a retrial that would not 
result in another death sentence; Articles 2 and 3 ECHR were at issue there.103 Ilaşcu and Others involved 
extraterritorial violations of Articles 3 and 5 ECHR but not, notably, acts of international cooperation in 
criminal matters.104 In El-Masri, as in Babar Ahmad and Others v UK, the Court defined ‘extraordinary 
rendition’ as ‘extra-judicial transfer’ to a situation in which there was a ‘real risk’ of treatment contrary 
to Article 3 ECHR.105
The stringency of the flagrant denial standard may be illustrated with three further cases. In Babar 
Ahmad, the Court refused to admit complaints under Article 6 ECHR that had been brought by alleged 
Islamic terrorists who were due to be extradited to the US.106 The Court accepted that the men would be 
subject to pre-trial ‘Special Administrative Measures’ (SAMs) that would severely restrict their ability to 
move and interact with other people.107 It found that, pre-trial, the measures were not a form of solitary 
confinement,108 however, and they were not such as to coerce the applicants into settlement; unduly 
restrict their rights to attorney-client privilege; or flagrantly impede the conduct of their defence.109 In 
making those findings, the Court (implicitly) disregarded expert testimony on the effect of SAMs on 
defendants110 and (explicitly) emphasised the strength of US constitutional guarantees as supervised by US 
trial courts.111 What could be called ‘rule of law factors’ were also instrumental in convincing Strasbourg 
that there was no real risk of the admission of torture evidence in the US.112 In addition, Strasbourg was 
sufficiently assured that the men would not be designated enemy combatants, sentenced to death or 
transferred extra-judicially to other jurisdictions.113 The likely conditions and length of the applicants’ 
detention post-trial were also not such as to coerce these applicants into accepting plea bargains.114 The 
real risk that they would spend the rest or the most of the rest of their lives subject to SAMs in ultra-high 
security (‘Supermax’) prisons did raise serious questions under Article 3 ECHR for the Court;115 
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however, it dismissed these complaints on the merits.116 Several other arguments on prosecutorial delay 
and jury prejudice, which related to adverse media coverage, US Government statements, anti-terrorist 
designations and the history of the forum (New York), were to be held manifestly ill-founded.117
If Babar Ahmad illustrates how the Court may respond when a request emanates from a third state 
with ‘a long history of respect of democracy, human rights and the rule of law’,118 Ahorugeze indicates 
how it may deal with requests from states that have been the scene of major human rights violations and 
political transitions. In Ahorugeze, the applicant was a Rwandan citizen and ethnic Hutu who had been 
head of the Rwandan Civil Aviation Authority before 1994.119 Resident in Denmark and apprehended 
in Sweden, the applicant was ordered to be extradited to Rwanda to stand trial for genocide and related 
offences.120 He complained to Strasbourg that Sweden had thereby exposed him to a flagrant denial 
of his rights under Article 6 ECHR.121 The Fifth Section acknowledged that several jurisdictions had 
previously refused the transfer or extradition of genocide suspects to Rwanda on fair trial grounds122 but 
ultimately held in favour of the Government.123 It emphasised that the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR) had recently found trial conditions in Rwanda much improved124 and that the 
Rwandan legislature had passed witness protection laws that had been considered effective by Dutch 
and Norwegian authorities.125 Information from those states, as well as the ICTR, likewise showed that 
Rwanda’s judiciary was sufficiently experienced, independent and impartial to hear and determine the 
applicant’s case.126 Finally, the applicant would be entitled to free legal representation from Rwanda’s 
well-qualified bar127 and was unlikely to be prejudiced by his previous position, his testimony for other 
defendants and his record of unsuccessful litigation in other Rwandan courts.128 
Finally, the recent decision of the Fourth Section in Willcox v UK and Hurford v UK indicates how the 
Court is likely to deal with complaints about presumptions in foreign proceedings.129 The first applicant, 
Mr Wilcox, was a UK citizen who had been convicted and sentenced to prison in Thailand for possessing 
illicit drugs for the purposes of distribution.130 Having succeeded in obtaining a transfer of his sentence 
to the UK under its bilateral prisoner transfer agreement with Thailand, the applicant challenged his 
detention under Article 5 ECHR. Amongst other things, he submitted that the enforcement of his prison 
sentence was arbitrary since it was based on an irrebuttable presumption under Thai law that possession 
of more than 3 grams of certain illicit substances was possession for the purposes of distribution.131 He 
argued that he been flagrantly denied justice because he had been unable to challenge the finding that 
drugs were intended for distribution.132 Whilst it acknowledged the possibility that the Thai presumption 
could give rise to a violation of Article 6(2) ECHR, the Court refused to find that the applicant had been 
flagrantly denied justice. Recalling Salabiaku v France,133 it noted and that the Thai prosecutor had still 
borne the burden of proving possession and that the court had heard evidence on this point. Moreover, 
the applicant had been tried in Thailand with adequate procedural safeguards: ‘He was tried in public 
before two independent judges; he was present throughout the proceedings and was legally represented; 
he was acquitted of some of the charges in accordance with the presumption of innocence (…) and he 
was sentenced in accordance with the applicable law and was given a significant reduction for his guilty 
116 babar Ahmad and Others v uK	(merits),	appl.	nos.	24027/07,	11949/08,	36742/08,	66911/09	and	67354/09,	10	April	2012.
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129 Willcox v uK and Hurford v uK,	appl.	nos.	43759/10	and	43771/12,	8	January	2013.
130 Willcox v uK and Hurford v uK,	appl.	nos.	43759/10	and	43771/12,	8	January	2013,	Para.	3.	
131 Willcox v uK and Hurford v uK,	appl.	nos.	43759/10	and	43771/12,	8	January	2013,	Para.	40.
132 Willcox v uK and Hurford v uK,	appl.	nos.	43759/10	and	43771/12,	8	January	2013,	Paras.	8,	93.
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plea (…).’134 It was also significant for the Court that the purpose of the presumption was to deter drug 
trafficking and that the applicant had not previously raised his concerns with the British authorities. 
The ECtHR, therefore, dismissed this applicant’s complaint under Article 5 ECHR as being manifestly 
ill-founded.135
Although they involved very different factual scenarios, Othman, Babar Ahmad, Ahorugeze, 
and Willcox all demonstrate the stringency of the flagrant denials standard under Article 6 ECHR in 
international cooperation cases. The cases confirm Aukje van Hoek and Michiel Luchtman’s observation 
that Strasbourg accommodates the State Parties’ interest in cooperation by accepting a ‘certain loss’ of 
fair trial rights in transnational cases.136 In my submission, the Court effectively creates a third category 
of proceeding under Article 6 ECHR to which an even more attenuated fair trial standard applies. In fact, 
its obiter in Othman notwithstanding, the Court would seem reluctant to find a flagrant denial of justice 
when the foreign proceedings do not involve or result in a violation of the right to life or the freedom 
from torture, inhuman or degrading treatment.137 The question is why the Court has been so shy in 
treating as ‘flagrant’ other types of injustice under Article 6 ECHR. In my view, the explanation has much 
to do with the principles of sovereignty, equality and consent in public international law, but not simply 
with the reluctance of the Court to impose Convention standards on non-contracting states. After all, 
Article 6 ECHR still places some limit on their ability to obtain assistance from ECHR State Parties and 
fair trial provisions appear in many other international ‘human’ and ‘fundamental’ rights instruments.138 
Rather, the Court’s extremely narrow interpretation of the flagrant denial test could reflect its uncertainty 
about the content of any customary human right to or general principle on the right to a fair trial in public 
international law.139 By sticking closely to the right to life and the freedom from torture, inhuman and 
degrading treatment in its application of the standard, the Court thus minimises the risk that it will stray 
far from the existing international consensus on states’ extraterritorial human rights obligations – whilst 
preventing the worst forms of human rights arbitrage in TCL and signalling that it could find violations 
in other cases. Effectively, in the flagrant denial test, the Court expresses its reluctance to cast judgment 
on ‘foreign’ notions of justice.
4.3. Proving flagrant denials in situations of asset recovery 
In any event, if we take the Court at its word and conceive of the flagrant denial test somewhat more 
broadly, cooperative confiscation cases aiming at asset recovery are likely to raise four issues. The first is 
how the ECtHR would conceptualise flagrant (un)fairness in a victim state that has recently undergone 
or is undergoing a major political transition: to what extent would it permit consideration of the previous 
position of the applicant PEP or related party in the requesting state or the requesting state’s decision to 
use exceptional rules to respond to past human wrongs?140 To what extent would it adapt the flagrant 
denial standard to accommodate conditions ‘on the ground’ in the victim jurisdiction? The Court 
construes the ECHR and its protocols in the light of other international conventions141 and has already 
recognised the need to apply procedural duties ‘realistically’ in post-conflict environments.142 That said, 
134 Willcox v uK and Hurford v uK,	appl.	nos.	43759/10	and	43771/12,	8	January	2013,	Para.	97.
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138	See,	 e.g.,	 Universal	 Declaration	 of	 Human	 Rights,	 GA	 Res.	 217	 (III),	 International	 Bill	 of	 Human	 Rights,	 UN	 Doc.	 A/RES/217(III)A-E	
(10	December	1948),	Declaration	of	Human	Rights,	Arts.	10-11;	1966	International	Covenant	on	Civil	and	Political	Rights,	999	united 
nations Treaty Series,	p.	171,	Art.	14;	1969	American	Convention	on	Human	Rights,	1144	united nations Treaty Series,	p.	143,	Art.	8;	
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Othman suggests a hard core of procedural guarantees that cannot be departed from in any political or 
security situation.
Second, what standard of proof would the Court use to determine that justice has been (or will be) 
flagrantly denied in the requesting state? Applying its stringent flagrant denial test in Ahorugeze, the 
Court took the view that ‘the same standard and burden of proof should apply as in the examination 
of extraditions and expulsions under Article 3’.143 It described the applicant’s task as being ‘to adduce 
evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if removed from a 
Contracting State, he would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to a flagrant denial of justice’.144 
However, in Othman (and El Haski), the rationale for employing the ‘real risk’ standard was closely 
linked to the difficulty of proving torture, especially in legal systems that do not operate according to 
the principles of the rule of law.145 Secrecy and official complicity are also associated with corruption 
offences; but they are typically cited to justify departures from standard criminal procedure and not to 
increase the level of scrutiny on the victim country. 
Third, presuming that the ‘real risk’ test applies, what evidence will the Court use to establish less 
grave flagrant denials and how will it respond to the type of evidence that is likely to be brought in asset 
recovery cases? In Babar Ahmad, the Strasbourg judges employed their knowledge of the constitutional 
guarantees and the legal and political culture in the US, supported by a statement from a US Government 
official, to conclude that that country could be relied upon to observe the fundamental requirements of 
Article 6 ECHR.146 In Othman, the opinions of non-governmental and international organisations were 
plainly crucial to the Court’s assessment of the actual or potential conditions in Jordan. In Yefimova 
v Russia, the First Section held it ‘[could] attach a certain weight to the information contained in 
recent reports from independent international human rights protection bodies and organisations, or 
governmental sources (…)’ about the situation in Kazakhstan.147 However, it found that the reports relied 
on in that case were too generally phrased and not indicative of treatment flagrantly contrary to Article 6 
ECHR.148 In asset recovery cases, respondent governments or intervening third parties may bring reports 
on corruption in the requesting state before the ECtHR to show the importance of cooperation for the 
purposes of asset recovery. However, precisely that evidence may disclose reasons for ‘distrusting’ the 
judicial system of the requesting state, at least as it was run under the old regime. If the requesting state 
has had time to institute reforms, Ahorugeze suggests that the ECtHR will seek to verify their effectiveness 
with reports from other states or international bodies. More than fifteen years after the genocide, it was 
satisfied of Rwanda’s progress. If the transition is still in the process of consolidation, however, the impact 
of post-transition justice sector reforms may be more difficult to assess, especially if the return of assets 
is requested before the conviction or final confiscation order.149
Fourth, which aspects of the foreign proceedings would have had to have been unfair and is the 
standard of unfairness the same for them all? Several processes in the victim state may lead to the issuing 
of the confiscation order, not least the trial for the predicate offence and the proceeding that results in 
the imposition of the confiscation order (if separate).150 The ECtHR has been reluctant to characterise 
the latter as giving rise to new ‘criminal charges’ under Article 6 ECHR: the Court has generally accepted 
that they are preventative, remedial or akin to the determination of a sentence.151 On this basis, it has 
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been prepared to accept a wide range of confiscation orders – made with the help of several types of 
evidentiary devices – as falling outside the scope of Article 6(2) and (3) ECHR and compatible with 
the general right to a fair procedure under Article 6(1) ECHR. These are exceptional cases, however,152 
and, in my submission, the Court is likely to face a particular challenge if it attempts to apply this 
jurisprudence, such as it is, to foreign confiscation orders that aim at asset recovery, particularly from 
third states. To avoid this challenge, the Court should either clarify the criteria that distinguish ‘civil’ 
from ‘criminal’ confiscation orders under Article 6 ECHR or continue to apply the same ‘flagrant denial’ 
test to acts of cooperation in civil and criminal matters.153 New jurisprudence suggests that the Court is 
taking a different route: according to the First Section in Insanov v Azerbaijan, the Court would only find 
a confiscation order that is part of the sentence procedurally disproportionate under Article 1 ECHR-P1 
if the criminal proceeding was itself a flagrant denial of justice.154 Although that case was a challenge to 
a domestic confiscation order, it was also, interestingly, brought by a former government minister who 
had been convicted of corruption.155
4.4. The standard of diligence 
A related but more general issue is how far the requested ECHR State Party is expected to go in 
determining whether the requesting state has committed or may commit a flagrant denial of justice. In 
asset recovery cases, what standard of diligence would be expected of the haven state when assessing 
confiscation requests under Article 6 ECHR? Would it have a duty to actively inquire into the fairness of 
the proceedings in the victim country or does it only have to consider the issue if raised?156 If there is a 
duty of active inquiry, does it apply to all requests or only to requests from some states?
The ECtHR uses different standards in its case law. In Drozd and Janousek, it required the ‘emergence’ 
of a flagrant injustice whereas, in Saccoccia, it referred to domestic courts having ‘duly satisfied 
themselves’ that the foreign proceedings complied with the Convention standard.157 Here, its apparent 
source was Pellegrini.158 However, in dealing with other forms of cooperation, the Court has looked at 
what the requested state ‘knew or should have known’ about the requesting state’s proceedings at the time 
it granted the request.159 Further, in Saccoccia, the Court appears to limit the need for review to requests 
that ‘emanate from the courts of a country that does not apply the convention (...)’.160 It made similar 
comments in Pellegrini161 and in Stapleton v Ireland,162 which concerned the execution of an European 
Arrest Warrant almost thirty years after the applicant’s alleged crimes.163 There, the fact that the UK was 
a party to the ECHR was the Court’s primary justification for finding no flagrant denial by Ireland of the 
right to a hearing within a reasonable time.164 
Commenting on Stapleton, André Klip concludes that ECHR State Parties are presumed to abide by 
Article 6 ECHR when cooperating with each other in criminal matters.165 This interpretation is in line 
with the ECtHR’s approach to cooperation under the auspices of the EU, specifically, its readiness to 
apply a ‘rebuttable presumption of equivalent protection’ to interferences that flow from a State Party’s 
‘strict international legal obligations’ towards the Union.166 That said, and as Gless explains, an inflexible 
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presumption of compliance for ECHR State Parties would seem to be at odds with the express justification 
for the flagrant denial test in Drozd and Janousek, namely, that Article 6 ECHR is attenuated because 
third states have not agreed to the Convention.167 Moreover, as both EU Member States and ECHR State 
Parties systematically violate fundamental rights and freedoms, membership of those legal spaces is not 
a reliable risk-based criterion for assigning responsibility under the ECHR.168 
Given these concerns, it is of note that the ECtHR has become more willing to scrutinise acts of 
cooperation among ECHR State Parties and between those states and international organisations. In 
M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece,169 it found Belgium liable for Greek violations of an Afghan asylum seeker’s 
rights under Article 3 ECHR.170 Since the Dublin Regulation empowered Belgium to refuse the transfer 
‘if [it] considered that (…) Greece, was not fulfilling its obligations under the Convention’,171 the matter 
‘did not strictly fall within Belgium’s international legal obligations [and] the presumption of equivalent 
protection [did] not apply (…).172 To the extent that there was an additional presumption that a State 
Party, like Greece, would ‘respect its international obligations in asylum matters’,173 this was rebutted 
by international reports, communications and EU reform efforts describing the treatment of asylum 
seekers there.174 Then, in Al-Jedda v UK, the Court established a presumption of compliance between 
measures that flow directly from UN Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII UN Charter and 
the ECHR:175 ‘In the event of any ambiguity in the terms of a Security Council Resolution, the Court must 
therefore choose the interpretation which is most in harmony with the requirements of the Convention 
and which avoids any conflict of obligations’.176 The Grand Chamber distinguished Al-Jedda in Nada v 
Switzerland, though it still found Switzerland in breach of Article 8 ECHR for failing to use its discretion 
under the resolution to ameliorate the effects of the sanctions on the applicant,177 an elderly man who had 
been effectively unable to leave his 1.6 km place of residence during the six-odd years of the travel ban.178 
What emerges from these cases is an unstable set of presumptions about the trustworthiness of 
requesting states and international organisations. The strongest presumption – of equivalent protection – 
is limited to State Parties’ ‘strict international legal obligations’ towards supranational organisations, 
such as the EU, that protect Convention rights and freedoms in a manner at least commensurable to 
the Convention.179 Next, is a presumption of compliance with the Convention by its State Parties: also 
rebuttable, it may require State Parties to monitor political, economic and legal developments within 
each other’s jurisdictions so as to ascertain whether the ‘presumption’ is warranted in a particular case. 
After that is the presumption of compliance by which binding UN Security Council resolutions are 
read as compatible with the ECHR. It, too, may be rebutted by ‘clear and explicit language, imposing an 
obligation to take measures capable of breaching human rights’;180 but, even then, the Court has been 
willing to read in a discretion to implement the obligations in compliance with human rights standards. 
Last, are requests from third states to which strictly no presumption applies – at least if the issue is raised, 
State Parties should ensure that justice will not be flagrantly denied. However, the Court would seem 
more willing to trust (or allow State Parties to trust) third states that have a ‘long history of respect of 
167	Gless,	supra	note	2.
168 See, e.g., Ananyev and Others v russia,	appl.	nos.	42525/07	and	60800/08,	10	 January	2012.	See	also	A.	van	Hoek	&	M.	Luchtman,	
‘Transnational	Cooperation	in	Criminal	Matters	and	the	Safeguarding	of	Human	Rights’,	2005	utrecht law review	1,	no.	2,	p.	10;	N.	Mole,	
‘The	Complex	and	Evolving	Relationship	between	the	European	Union	and	the	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights’,	2012	European 
Human rights law review,	no.	4,	p.	364.
169 M.S.S. v belgium and Greece	[GC],	appl.	no.	30696/09,	[2011]	ECHR.
170	And	Art.	13	due	to	the	 lack	of	 remedies	against	such	violations	 in	 its	own	 legal	system:	M.S.S. v belgium and Greece [GC], appl. no. 
30696/09,	[2011]	ECHR,	Paras.	353-354,	369-396.	See	Council	Regulation	(EC)	no.	343/2003	of	18	February	2003	establishing	the	criteria	
and	mechanisms	for	determining	the	Member	State	responsible	for	examining	an	asylum	application	lodged	in	one	of	the	Member	States	
by	a	third-country	national,	OJ	L	50,	25.2.2003,	p.	1.
171 M.S.S. v belgium and Greece	[GC],	appl.	no.	30696/09,	[2011]	ECHR,	Para.	340.	
172 M.S.S. v belgium and Greece	[GC],	appl.	no.	30696/09,	[2011]	ECHR,	Para.	340.
173 M.S.S. v belgium and Greece	[GC],	appl.	no.	30696/09,	[2011]	ECHR,	Paras.	343,	345.
174 M.S.S. v belgium and Greece	[GC],	appl.	no.	30696/09,	[2011]	ECHR,	Paras.	344-352.
175 Al-Jedda v uK	[GC],	appl.	no.	27021/08,	[2011]	ECHR,	Para.	102.
176 Al-Jedda v uK	[GC],	appl.	no.	27021/08,	[2011]	ECHR,	Para.	102.
177 nada v Switzerland [GC],	appl.	no.	10593/08,	12	September	2012,	Paras.	172-198.	See	 further	A.	Henderson,	 ‘When	the	UN	breach	
human	rights…	who	wins?’,	<http://ukhumanrightsblog.com>	(last	visited	10	October	2012).
178 nada v Switzerland [GC],	appl.	no.	10593/08,	12	September	2012,	Para.	172.
179 bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v Ireland	[GC],	appl.	no.	45036/98,	[2005-VI]	ECHR,	Para.	157.
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162
The Right to a Fair Trial and International Cooperation in Criminal Matters
democracy, human rights and the rule of law (...)’.181 When the requesting state is not a liberal democracy, 
it appears to require a closer examination of the guarantees and procedures in the foreign courts. There 
are questions about how the Court distinguishes one type of third state from another, given that it focuses 
on reports by states, NGOs, and international organisations and does not engage with sociological or 
political literature on ‘transitions to democracy’ or the rule of law. This may simply and rightly reflect 
the limits on a court’s expertise and access to evidence; it does raise questions about the accuracy of its 
assessments of the risk of injustice from particular foreign countries.
4.5. The effect of assurances and the importance of monitoring
If there are substantial grounds for believing that a person would be exposed to a flagrant denial of 
justice abroad, how relevant are a requesting state’s assurances that it will respect fair trial rights? The 
ECtHR has again taken different views over time. In Mamatkulov and Askarov v Turkey, the majority of 
the Grand Chamber gave substantial weight to statements by the Uzbek Public Prosecutor that ‘“[t]he 
applicants’ property will not be liable to general confiscation, and the applicants will not be subjected 
to acts of torture or sentenced to capital punishment” (...)’, not to mention its ‘“reaffirm[ation of] its 
obligation to comply with the requirements of the provisions of [the UN Convention against Torture182] 
as regards both Turkey and the international community as a whole” (...)’.183 In Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v 
UK, it implied that State Parties may have an obligation to seek assurances that a prisoner’s rights will be 
respected before surrendering him/her to the requesting state.184 However, in Saadi v Italy, as in Chahal 
v UK, it found that the provision of assurances from Tunisia:
‘would not have absolved the Court from the obligation to examine whether such assurances 
provided, in their practical application, a sufficient guarantee that the applicant would be 
protected against the risk of treatment prohibited by the Convention (...)’.185
Applying Saadi in Othman, the Fourth Section found that Jordan had provided adequate assurances 
against torture186 and listed eleven factors that were relevant to its assessment: 
‘(i) whether the terms of the assurances have been disclosed to the Court (...);
(ii) whether the assurances are specific or are general and vague (...);
(iii) who has given the assurances and whether that person can bind the receiving State (...);
(iv) if the assurances have been issued by the central government of the receiving State, whether 
local authorities can be expected to abide by them;
(v) whether the assurances concerns [sic] treatment which is legal or illegal in the receiving 
State (...);
(vi) whether they have been given by a Contracting State (...);
(vii) the length and strength of bilateral relations between the sending and receiving States, 
including the receiving State’s record in abiding by similar assurances (...);
(viii) whether compliance with the assurances can be objectively verified through diplomatic or 
other monitoring mechanisms, including providing unfettered access to the applicant’s lawyers 
(...);
(ix) whether there is an effective system of protection against torture in the receiving State, 
including whether it is willing to cooperate with international monitoring mechanisms 
(including international human rights NGOs), and whether it is willing to investigate allegations 
of torture and to punish those responsible (...);
181 babar Ahmad and Others v uK,	appl.	nos.	24027/07,	11949/08,	36742/08,	66911/09	and	67354/09,	10	April	2012,	Para.	179.
182	1984	Convention	against	Torture	and	Other	Cruel,	 Inhuman	or	Degrading	Treatment	or	Punishment,	New	York,	1465	united nations 
Treaty Series,	p.	85.
183 Mamatkulov and Askarov v Turkey	[GC],	appl.	nos.	46827/99	and	46951/99,	[2005-I]	ECHR,	Para.	76.	Cf.	Joint	Partly	Dissenting	Opinion	of	
Judges	Bratza,	Bonello	and	Hedigan.	
184 Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v uK,	appl.	no.	61498/08,	2	March	2010,	Paras.	164-165.	
185 Saadi v Italy [GC],	appl.	no.	37201/06,	[2008]	ECHR,	Para.	148	citing	Chahal v uK,	15	November	1996,	[1996-V]	ECHR,	Para.	105.
186 Othman (Abu Qatada) v uK,	appl.	no.	8139/09,	17	January	2012,	Paras.	186-207.
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(x) whether the applicant has previously been ill-treated in the receiving State (...); and
(xi) whether the reliability of the assurances has been examined by the domestic courts of the 
sending/Contracting State (...).’187
Specifically addressed to the risk of torture, these factors guide the Court in considering the effect of 
assurances against other types of violation, Babar Ahmad suggests.188 I submit that points (viii) and (ix) 
would be particularly important in cases of cooperative confiscations aimed at asset recovery. Not only 
do international organisations and NGOs already supervise aspects of asset recovery processes,189 but, 
when assistance is requested by a state in transition and/or without a long history of the rule of law, the 
Court would seem to regard monitoring as a supplement to (or a substitute for) reliable supervision 
of the executive by the courts.190 In Ahorugeze, for example, the Fourth Section noted with approval 
that the ICTR had ordered the monitoring of other transferred Rwandan proceedings and that ‘Sweden 
ha[d] declared itself prepared to monitor’ the Rwandan proceedings against the applicant, as well as 
the conditions of his detention.191 In Othman, the ‘very fact of monitoring visits’ lessened the risk of a 
violation under Article 3 ECHR.192 The Court’s confidence in this non-judicial, non-state procedure is all 
the more striking when one considers the seriousness of torture as a violation of the ECHR; the Court’s 
findings on the degree of risk of torture in Jordan; the inadequacy of Jordanian judicial guarantees; and 
the relative dependence of the NGO in that case on the two cooperating states.193 
5. Conclusions
Concluding this article, I return to the questions I embedded in Section 1: Which general principles are 
part of transnational criminal law? Do they include the right to a fair trial? And, if so, which methods of 
cooperation between law enforcement authorities endanger those fundamental (human) entitlements? 
I explored these questions by asking whether ECHR State Parties are likely to violate Article 6 ECHR by 
directly enforcing foreign confiscation orders that have been issued abroad with regard to illicit wealth 
in grand corruption cases. Identifying cooperative confiscation as one mechanism by which states have 
sought to prevent, suppress and remediate the transnational crime(s) of corruption, I showed in Section 2 
that states have sought to enable ‘asset recovery’ by encouraging or requiring each other to lower the 
barriers to confiscation and cooperation in the anti-corruption and related treaties and instruments. Such 
approaches have found favour with other international actors as measures to enhance the enjoyment of 
human rights, in particular, social, cultural and economic rights. They are, however, a perceived source 
of tension with other civil and political human entitlements. 
Perceived or real, the tension between human rights and anti-corruption policies will be mediated in 
part by regional human rights tribunals. In Section 3, I considered how the ECtHR regulates the adverse 
consequences of international cooperation in criminal matters for Convention rights and freedoms. 
I showed that the ECtHR has begun deciding the issues that would or could arise in asset recovery 
cases, not least, the responsibility of State Parties for (extraterritorial) violations of fair trial rights that 
are directly perpetrated by other states or ordered by international organisations. The test for imposing 
responsibility under Article 6 ECHR in cooperative cases remains unclear: the Court has acknowledged 
that ‘flagrant denials’ could arise due to several forms of injustice; however, it has been reticent to find 
violations of Article 6 ECHR in cooperation cases that did not involve or result in treatment contrary to 
Article 2 or 3 ECHR. 
Were the ECtHR indeed prepared to find flagrant denials in a broader range of cases, I considered, 
in Section 4, the issues of application: What is the basis of the Court’s jurisdiction to apply Convention 
rights to international cooperation proceedings? How should the Court conceptualize the risk of flagrant 
187 Othman (Abu Qatada) v uK,	appl.	no.	8139/09,	17	January	2012,	Para.	189.
188 babar Ahmad and Others v uK,	appl.	nos.	24027/07,	11949/08,	36742/08,	66911/09	and	67354/09,	10	April	2012,	Paras.	98,	106-108,	110.
189	See	M.	Pieth,	‘Collective	Action	and	Corruption’,	in	M.	Pieth	(ed.),	Collective Action: Innovative Strategies to Prevent Corruption,	2012.
190 Ahorugeze v Sweden, appl.	no.	37075/09,	27	October	2011,	Para.	127.
191 Ahorugeze v Sweden, appl.	no.	37075/09,	27	October	2011,	Para.	127.
192 Othman (Abu Qatada) v uK,	appl.	no.	8139/09,	17	January	2012,	Paras.	24,	80-82,	203-204.
193 Othman (Abu Qatada) v uK,	appl.	no.	8139/09,	17	January	2012,	Paras.	191-192,	203-204,	278.
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unfairness in a state that has recently undergone a major political transition? What type and degree of 
proof of unfairness does the Court demand of applicants? To what extent does it impose a duty on the 
requested State Party to ascertain actual or potential injustices in the foreign proceedings? And when 
does the Court allow the requested state to rely on assurances that fair trial rights would be respected 
in foreign proceedings? Considering these issues through the lens of the Court’s existing extradition, 
expulsion, confiscation and cooperation case law generated further questions as well as answers for 
cooperative confiscation cases that aim at asset recovery.
The article thus ends with reflections on the ways in which the Court’s ‘flagrant denial’ case law 
could contribute to the formulation of a general principle on the right to a fair trial in TCL. I speculated 
that the Court’s reluctance to detach Article 6 from Articles 2 and 3 ECHR in cooperation cases was due 
to its unwillingness to formulate a ‘global’ concept of justice and a fair trial. So, what does the ECtHR’s 
cooperation and ‘flagrant denial’ case law tell us about this project’s greater goal of identifying general 
principles of TCL? Applying Gless and Vervaele’s inductive/comparative approach, the ECtHR’s ‘flagrant 
denial’ cases would go some way to showing that ‘a right to a fair trial’ is a general principle of TCL, at 
least within the legal space of the Convention. As the judicial arm of an international organisation, the 
ECtHR contributes to the formation of customary rules and general principles of international law, at 
least among Party States. Then, when the ECHR State Parties comply with the Court’s pronouncements 
or incorporate its standards into their national MLA laws – in full or subject to the effet attendué – 
they act and talk as if these standards are internationally legally binding.194 The fair trial provisions in 
other human rights instruments and in domestic law would also seem to count towards such a general 
principle, though whether these provisions actually create similarly strict obligations would need to be 
established with further empirical research.195 Likewise, it remains to be seen how other regional human 
rights bodies apply and possibly attenuate ‘their’ fair trial standards in international cooperation cases.196 
Deducing a fair trial principle from a telos of TCL is a promising but difficult undertaking. If TCL 
includes human rights norms, as well as substantive and procedural norms on transnational crime, there 
is a good argument for saying, as Gless and Vervaele have done, that its object is to achieve justice – and 
that fair trials are essential to that objective. The challenge is to defend a definition of TCL in more 
normatively heterogeneous ‘spaces’ than Europe and to defend and specify the resulting concept of justice 
and a ‘fair trial’. In doing the former, we encounter the lack of a clear, positive higher-order norm that 
regulates the horizontal and vertical relationships between international legal norms.197 If we revert to 
the traditional language of sources of law and rules on treaty interpretation, we are helped by references 
to due process198 and the rights of third parties199 in the anti-corruption suppression conventions – not, 
however, by the lack of direct references to human rights in most of those instruments. In doing the 
latter, we encounter the diversity of domestic and international norms that comprise TCL and, with it, 
the following questions: if TCL emerges from different legal systems and philosophical traditions, can 
we assume that its norms reflect a congruent concept of ‘justice’? If so, can we assume that the area of 
overlap is sufficient to give rise to a meaningful transnational general principle on the right to a fair trial? 
These issues will continue to be investigated as part of this project and other efforts to identify and justify 
emerging global systems of (criminal) justice, human rights and the rule of law. ¶
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